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The Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction
Over Disputes Between the United States and
a State
LOCHLAN F. SHELFER†
ABSTRACT
Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to hear controversies
between a state and the United States? Although the Supreme
Court has asserted this power, commentators have puzzled over the
question for decades. Because Article III does not enumerate
controversies between a state and the United States, many scholars
have concluded that the Court’s exercise of this power is
illegitimate, or at least atextual. This Article argues that the
Constitution’s text does give the Supreme Court the power to hear
such controversies, but to understand why it is necessary to
understand the way that the framers would, for the sake of brevity,
combine several concepts into a single phrase, what this Article
terms “collapse textualism.” The framers combined two heads of
jurisdiction (“controversies between the United States and a State”
and “all other controversies involving the United States”) into a
single grant of jurisdiction over “Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party.” Thus, because the Court has original
jurisdiction over those controversies “in which a State shall be a
Party” it therefore has original jurisdiction over “controversies
between the United States and a State.”

INTRODUCTION
Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction over
controversies between a state and the United States?

† Associate Fellow, Stanford Law School Constitutional Law Center and
Associate Attorney, Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice Group, Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher.
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Doctrinally, this question has been answered in the
affirmative. Ever since the Supreme Court first considered
the puzzle in Justice Harlan’s 1892 opinion, United States v.
Texas,1 which affirmed jurisdiction, the Court has heard
numerous cases between a state and the United States in its
original jurisdiction,2 and has even entertained suits by a
state against the United States when there is federal
consent.3 Furthermore, Congress has codified these rulings
in statute, stating that “The Supreme Court shall have
original but not exclusive jurisdiction of . . . . [a]ll
controversies between the United States and a State.”4
This jurisdiction, however, has been criticized from all
corners of the legal world, from the pages of the U.S. Reports
1. 143 U.S. 621 (1892) (suit in equity brought by the United States against
Texas to determine the boundary between that state and a territory of the United
States). Before this landmark case, the Supreme Court heard two cases that
included the United States as a party, although it did not consider the
jurisdictional issue. United States v. North Carolina, 136 U.S 211 (1890) (action
of debt at law brought by the United States against North Carolina for interest
on bonds issued by the state); Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478 (1854)
(United States permitted to intervene as a non-technical party in a boundary
dispute between the two states, because the United States had granted the
disputed lands to Florida).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Maine, 469 U.S. 504 (1985) (action by the United
States against thirteen States that border the Atlantic Ocean to determine
whether the United States has exclusive rights to the seabed and subsoil under
the ocean off the States’ coastlines); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699
(1950) (bill in equity by the United States against Louisiana to determine and
declare the title to tidelands off Louisiana’s coast); United States v. California,
332 U.S. 19 (1949) (bill in equity by the United States against the State of
California to determine which government has paramount rights in and power
over submerged land off the coast of California); see also United States v.
California, 436 U.S. 32 (1978); United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531 (1975);
United States v. Michigan, 190 U.S. 379 (1903).
3. See, e.g., California v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 277 n.6 (1982);
California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 63, 65–68 (1979) (holding that California may
file its bill to quiet title to the submerged lands against Arizona and the United
States because Congress had waived federal sovereign immunity); Utah v. United
States, 403 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1971) (resolving conflicting claims between Utah and
the United States to the shorelands around the Great Salt Lake); see also 43
U.S.C. §§ 615vv, 616d(e), 620m, 1551(c) (1970) (consenting to suit by a state
under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (2012).
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to those of law reviews and treatises, and Justice Harlan’s
opinion in United States v. Texas has received sustained
criticism for over a century. In addition to Chief Justice
Fuller’s dissent, joined by Justice Lamar,5 Justice
Frankfurter has called Justice Harlan’s decision “precluded”
by the “merely literal language of the Constitution.”6
Commentators have described Justice Harlan’s Texas
decision as “ignoring,”7 “inconsistent with,”8 and “a single
point of divergence from”9 the Court’s original jurisdiction
doctrine. Others have called it “strained”10 and even
“unconstitutional.”11 Indeed, Federal Courts textbooks
present the puzzle to students as a seemingly irreconcilable
paradox.12
The problem centers on the interpretation of Article III’s
jurisdictional “menu.”13 Article III, Section 2, Clause 1
5. 143 U.S. at 648–49 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
6. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 598 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
7. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of
Economic Interests, 1889–1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 324, 330 n.46 (1985).
8. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of
the Federal Courts, 1801–1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 646, 693 n.290 (1982).
9. Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as QuasiInternational Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court’s Original and Exclusive
Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States Against States, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1789 (2004).
10. Evan H. Caminker, State Immunity Waivers for Suits by the United
States, 98 MICH. L. REV. 92, 103 (1999).
11. Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 489, 491 n.217 (1989) (rejecting this
“literal” interpretation as an “‘autistic’ reading” of the Constitution’s text).
12. See, e.g., ROBERT N. CLINTON, ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 1434 (1996); DAVID P. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS
323 (4th ed. 1990); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 256–57 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter
HART & WECHSLER, 6th ed.]; LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 160 (2d ed.
2003).
13. For use of the term “menu” to describe the nine jurisdictional grants in
Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, see Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of
Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205,
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outlines federal jurisdictional as follows:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to
all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to
Controversies between two or more States;— between a State and
Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States;—
between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.14

Clause 2 of that same Section states: “In all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court
shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction . . . .”15
The question is, to what does “those” refer? In other
words, over which state-party cases or controversies does the
Supreme Court have original jurisdiction?
Most Supreme Court cases and commentators have
concluded that “those” refers to the three state-party-based
jurisdictional grants from Clause 1, namely “Controversies
between two or more States; . . . between a State and
Citizens of another State; . . . and between a State . . . and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”16 Under this “diversity”
reading of Article III, Section 2, Clause 2, the Supreme Court
has state-party-based original jurisdiction only when the
other party is another state(s), a citizen(s) of another state,
or a foreign state(s), citizen(s), or subject(s).
Not included in Clause 1’s list, however, are the words
219, 245 (1985).
14. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
15. Id. cl. 2.
16. Id. cl. 1; see infra notes 57–59.
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“Controversies between the United States and a State.”
Instead, Clause 1 includes the broader words, “Controversies
to which the United States shall be a Party.”17 Thus, the
“diversity” interpretation of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction, on the surface, would not seem to encompass
disputes between the United States and a state. Accordingly,
many of those who support the “diversity” reading have
assumed the Supreme Court acted inconsistently and
illegitimately when it exercised its original jurisdiction over
a controversy between a state and the United States.
On the other side are those who see United States v.
Texas as the lone case espousing what, in their opinion, is the
true interpretation of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction: that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction
over all federal question cases with a state as a party,
regardless of the remaining party configurations.18 These
scholars point to the Supreme Court’s later repudiation of
this theory, most notably in Texas v. ICC,19 as inconsistent
with United States v. Texas, and inconsistent with the
Constitution itself.
This Article offers a third interpretation. It argues that
the diversity reading of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction is correct: the Supreme Court has state-partybased original jurisdiction only over those cases for which the
Constitution grants federal jurisdiction on account of the
presence of a state, i.e. suits between states, suits between a
state and citizens of other states, and suits between a state
and a foreign state or its citizens. The text of the
Constitution, however, allows for one more category to be
included with this list: suits between a state and the United
States. Numerous delegates suggested giving the federal
judicial power jurisdiction over controversies between the
United States and a state, and over controversies between
17. Id. cl. 1.
18. See infra note 56.
19. 258 U.S. 158 (1922).
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the United States and an individual. The Framers did not,
however, enumerate all of the different United States-based
categories over which the Constitution granted federal
jurisdiction, i.e. State-United States cases, citizen-United
States cases, foreign state-United States cases, foreign
citizen-United States cases, etc. Instead, they used a single
catch-all: “[c]ontroversies to which the United States shall be
a [p]arty.”20 Both the delegates and the ratifiers understood
that this provision was in fact two separate provisions: one
over controversies between the United States and a state,
and one over other controversies between the United States
and an individual or foreign state. This understanding was
informed by antecedents and expectations over what sorts of
controversies the federal power would adjudicate.
This Article thus presents a case-study of “collapse
textualism.” Several times during the Philadelphia
Convention, the Constitution’s drafters consolidated several
more specific earlier provisions into a single general
provision. Because of the antecedents of the Articles of
Confederation and the English judicial procedures, however,
both the drafters and later the ratifiers understood that the
terse provision contained more assumptions than the bare
words, stripped of context, would imply.
Relying on the historical antecedents to the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction, the process of drafting the
Judiciary Article in the Constitutional Convention, and the
ensuing ratification debates, this Article argues that the
framers and ratifiers all assumed that the phrase,
“Controversies to which the United States shall be a
[p]arty,”21 was a combination of two jurisdictional grants: one
between the United States and a state, and one between the
United States and an individual litigant. By combining these
two grants into the simpler formulation, the framers
followed their general pattern of avoiding pleonasm in the
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
21. Id.
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Constitution’s text.
Thus, this Article seeks to rescue the doctrine of the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over suits between the
United States and a state from ignominy. Further, it
explains “collapse textualism” and the way the Framers
spoke in a terse, abbreviated way, letting background
assumptions inform the text. Finally, it argues that Justice
Harlan’s opinion in United States v. Texas did not argue that
the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over all federal
question cases; instead, Justice Harlan made textual and
contextual arguments in favor of jurisdiction in that case in
particular.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE SUPREME COURT’S ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION
Perhaps the most remarkable year in the history of
popular constitutionalism occurred between the summers of
1970 and 1971.
On June 22, 1970, the Voting Rights Act of 1970 was
enacted,22 which set eighteen as the voting age for federal
and state elections.23 Almost immediately, states and the
United States filed motions for leave to file bills of
complaint24 against each other in the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction.25 The states claimed that Congress
“exceeded its constitutional powers and thereby usurped
powers reposed in the states, present[ing] conflicting claims
of governmental powers with regard to the same subject

22. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314
(1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-1).
23. Id. § 302, 84 Stat. at 318.
24. Before an original action can be brought before the Supreme Court, the
plaintiff must file a motion for leave to file. SUP. CT. R. 17.3.
25. Oregon v. Mitchell, Orig. No. 43, Texas v. Mitchell, Orig. No. 44, United
States v. Arizona, Orig. No. 46, United States v. Idaho, Orig. No. 47, 400 U.S. 112
(1970) (bills consolidated).
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matter.”26
The Supreme Court accepted the case, and on December
21, 1970, six months after the bill had been signed, struck
down the provision regulating state elections as
unconstitutional.27 The Court concluded, “Congress cannot
interfere with the age for voters set by the States for state
and local elections.”28
Two months later, on March 23, 1971, Congress proposed
a constitutional amendment establishing eighteen as the
minimum voting age for all elections,29 and it was ratified on
July 1, 1971 as the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.30
Thus, in the space of only twelve months, a law was
enacted, the Supreme Court struck it down as
unconstitutional, and the Constitution was amended to
overturn that decision. This remarkable year belies the
common trope that the Constitution is nearly impossible to
amend, and demonstrates that the populace can take charge
of its own governing document, even in the face of state
resistance.
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment was possible because the
26. Brief on Motion for Leave To File Complaint, at 3, Texas v. Mitchell, Orig.
No. 44, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
27. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970).
28. Id.; see id. at 125 (“[T]he whole Constitution reserves to the States the
power to set voter qualifications in state and local elections, except to the limited
extent that the people through constitutional amendments have specifically
narrowed the powers of the States.”).
29. Proposed Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 85 Stat.
825; S. JOURNAL, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 204 (1971); H. JOURNAL, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 367 (1971).
30. Certification of Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
Extending the Right to Vote to Citizens Eighteen Years of Age or Older, 36 Fed.
Reg. 12,725–26 (July 7, 1971); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (“Section 1. The
right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of age. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.”). For an analysis of the capacious scope of such
enforcement clauses, see generally Jonathan F. Mitchell, Textualism and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1237 (2017).
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Court immediately took up the case in its original
jurisdiction to determine its constitutionality.31 This allowed
the issue to remain visible, prevent malaise, and engage the
citizenry to amend the Constitution. But was the Supreme
Court’s review of the case in this manner legitimate? Can the
Court hear a case between a state and (functionally) the
United States? The Court itself declined to address the
question. As Justice Black wrote, “[n]o question has been
raised concerning the standing of the parties or the
jurisdiction of this Court,” and the Court did not consider the
justiciability of the case further.32 Where did the Supreme
Court get the jurisdiction to decide this controversy?
Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 contains a jurisdictional
menu of nine items to which federal jurisdiction extends:
The judicial Power shall extend to [1] all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—[2]
to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;—[3] to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—
[4] to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—
[5] to Controversies between two or more States;—[6] between a
State and Citizens of another State;—[7] between Citizens of
different States;—[8] between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and [9] between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.33

Clause 2 of that same Section states:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before
31. Cf. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (St. George Tucker ed.,
1803) (arguing that hearing state-party cases in the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction was intended to increase the “dispatch to the decision of such
important cases, by taking away all unnecessary delays, by appeal”).
32. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 117 n.1. Oregon argued that it had jurisdiction based
on South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 382 U.S. 898 (1965), but that case also did not
address justiciability. Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Motion for Leave To File
Complaint, Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, at 8–9 (1970) (No. 43 Orig.).
33. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make.34

Thus, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over “those”
disputes “in which a State shall be a Party.”35 There are three
possible interpretations of the word “those.” It may refer to
any case whatsoever with a state as a party, it may refer to
any case within the federal judicial power with a state as a
party, or it may refer only to those controversies wherein
federal jurisdiction is granted by virtue of the presence of a
state as a party. Below, this Article discusses each of these
possibilities, arguing that the correct interpretation is the
last: “those” refers only to those controversies where federal
jurisdiction is granted on account of the presence of a state
as a party.
A. Any Case with a State as a Party
First, “those” could refer to any cases whatsoever, even
those outside of Article III’s jurisdictional menu, so long as a
state is a party, such as a suit based entirely on state law
between a state and one of its own citizens, or a state
criminal prosecution based on state criminal law. In other
words, this interpretation would read this part of Article III,
Section 2, Clause 2 as an independent grant of jurisdiction
over and above the jurisdictional menu of Clause 1. Neither
justices nor scholars, however, have embraced this
interpretation,36 and with good reason: the word “those”
34. Id. cl. 2.
35. Id.
36. See Pennsylvania v. Quicksilver Co., 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 553, 556 (1871)
(“Th[e] second clause distributes the jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme
Court in the previous one into original and appellate jurisdiction; but does not
profess to confer any.”); HART & WECHSLER, 6th ed., supra note 12, at 256 (stating
that the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over state-party cases “might have
been construed as an independent grant of jurisdiction to hear any such case,
whether or not it fell within one of the previously specified nine heads of
jurisdiction. However, this broadest of possible constructions has been uniformly
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must reference a pre-defined antecedent, as opposed to the
universe of legal cases. Therefore, we can dispense with this
first interpretation.
B. Any Case Within the Federal Judicial Power Where a
State is a Party
Second, the word “those” could refer to all nine grants of
federal jurisdiction. Under this reading, the Supreme Court
would have original jurisdiction over any case within any
federal court’s jurisdiction, so long as one party was a state.
Thus, the Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction
over a federal question or admiralty case between a state and
a citizen of that state, or over a state prosecuting someone
for violation of federal law.
The Supreme Court has rejected this reading. In Texas
v. ICC, for example, Texas sued the Interstate Commerce
Commission, a federal agency, seeking a declaration that the
Transportation Act of 1920 was unconstitutional.37 The
Court held that the Texas railroad carriers were essential
parties and would have to be joined, but that some of them
were citizens of Texas.38 Therefore, the Court concluded, the
suit would cease to be one purely between a state and
citizen(s) of another state, and thus the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction was defeated.39 The Court accordingly
dismissed Texas’s bill, despite the case’s federal question.40
At least one scholar has joined the Court in rejecting this

rejected.”); Amar, supra note 11, at 481 (“[Such a] reading of the state party
clause would, taken alone, seem to mean that the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction in a purely state law case brought by a state against its own citizens.
Yet that surely cannot be right, for such a case does not even fall within the
Article III jurisdictional menu . . . .”).
37. 258 U.S. 158, 159 (1922).
38. Id. at 164.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 165.
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reading of Article III.41
Others, however, have criticized the Supreme Court’s
conclusion in Texas v. ICC. The Solicitor General, for
instance, on more than one occasion has argued to the
Supreme Court that it should overrule Texas v. ICC and hold
that the Court’s original jurisdiction comprehends any case
arising under any of the nine heads of federal jurisdiction if
a state happens to be a party. The Solicitor General first took
this position in 1973. The state of Georgia sued President
Nixon and several federal officers, seeking a declaration that
it was entitled to receive federal assistance under various
federal statutes, and an order enjoining defendants from
withholding those sums.42 Solicitor General Robert Bork
urged the Court to grant the motion, arguing that the case
offered “far and away the best opportunity of reaching a
fully-informed and prompt judgment on the complex and
profound issues at stake in the assertion of presidential
discretion to affect rates and amounts of spending.”43 Bork
acknowledged, however, the possible jurisdictional difficulty
that, although all the named defendants were citizens of
states other than Georgia, the President had nominated
Russell Train to the position of Administrator of the EPA,
and Train was a citizen of the District of Columbia.44 Thus,
exercise of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction would
conflict with the dictum in California v. Southern Pacific
Company that the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over
cases between a state and a citizen of another state requires
all the defendants to be citizens of other states, and the
District of Columbia was not another state.45 Bork suggested
41. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 11, at 489 (rejecting this “literal” interpretation
as an “autistic reading” of the Constitution’s text).
42. Georgia’s Motion for Leave To File Complaint, at 19–20, Georgia v. Nixon,
414 U.S. 810 (1973) (No. 63 Orig.).
43. Memorandum for the Defendants, at 2–4, Georgia v. Nixon, 414 U.S. 810
(1973) (No. 63 Orig.).
44. Id. at 9–12.
45. California v. South Pacific Co., 157 U.S. 229, 258 (1895).
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that the Court overrule Texas v. ICC and hold that any case
raising a federal question in which a state is a party is within
the Court’s original jurisdiction.46 As Bork argued,
“[c]ertainly it seems inappropriate that issues of this Court’s
original jurisdiction and its capacity to entertain cases of
great constitutional moment should depend upon whether a
nominee for an administrative position happens at the
moment to reside in the District or in Virginia.”47 The Court
summarily dismissed Georgia’s motion for leave to file a bill
of complaint.48
More than a decade later, the Solicitor General again
opined that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over
any case within the federal jurisdiction as long as a state is
a party. In 1985, Indiana sued the United States in the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. It argued that Richard
McIntyre had been “duly elected” as Representative of
Indiana’s Eighth Congressional District at the November 6,
1984 general election, after which Indiana certified McIntyre
as winner of the election.49 On January 3, 1985, the House of
Representatives passed House Resolution 1, which referred
“the question of the right of Frank McCloskey or Richard
McIntyre to a seat” to the Committee on House
Administration.50 Indiana sued to enjoin the House of

46. Memorandum for the Defendants, at 11–12, Georgia v. Nixon, 414 U.S.
810 (1973) (No. 63 Orig.) (acknowledging that the Court may have to overrule
Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S. 158, and New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U.S. 52 (1917)).
47. Id. at 13.
A number of other states, who had initiated similar causes of action in lower
federal courts, filed a brief as Amici Curiae, arguing that the Court not grant the
motion for leave to file a bill of complaint in the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction. They argued that the Court would be deprived of the opportunity of
the opinions of lower federal courts, but did not raise any jurisdictional
opposition. Brief for Amici Curiae, Georgia v. Nixon, 414 U.S. 810 (1973) (No. 63
Orig.).
48. Georgia v. Nixon, 414 U.S. 810, 810 (1973).
49. Indiana’s Motion for Leave To File a Complaint at 3–4, Indiana v. United
States, 471 U.S. 1123 (1985) (No. 102 Orig.).
50. Id. at 5.
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Representatives from refusing to administer the oath of
office to McIntyre.51
Solicitor General Rex Lee stated that the United States
opposed the bill, arguing that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question, because the matter concerns “a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department.”52 Lee did not,
however, contest Indiana’s standing to bring the case. He
acknowledged that “Indiana here has sufficiently alleged
injury to the State in its sovereign capacity.”53 Lee then went
further, arguing that the Court “enjoys concurrent
jurisdiction of all cases within the federal judicial power, not
barred by sovereign immunity, where a state is a party,
including a suit founded on federal law by a state against its
own citizens.”54 The Court summarily dismissed Indiana’s
motion for leave to file a bill of complaint.55
Some scholars, too, have argued that the original
understanding of the word “those” extends the Court’s
original jurisdiction to any case in the federal judicial power
where a state is a party. Professor Pfander, for instance, has
argued that the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction should
be interpreted “to encompass all state-party cases, including
federal question and admiralty cases, and not simply the
diverse-party controversies.”56
51. Id. at 6.
52. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 6, Indiana v. United States,
471 U.S. 1123 (1985) (No. 102 Orig.) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962)).
53. Id. at 5 n.2.
54. Id. at 4 n.2 (emphasis added). The House of Representatives also filed a
Brief in Opposition, arguing that they had already sworn in McCloskey, thus
rendering the controversy moot. Brief for the United States House of
Representatives Defendants in Opposition at 3, Indiana v. United States, 471
U.S. 1123 (1985) (No. 102 Orig.).
55. Indiana v. United States, 471 U.S. 1123, 1123 (1985).
56. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original
Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 561 (1994); id. at 560
(“[T]he text of the clause . . . refers to state-party ‘cases’ and thus appears to
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C. Only Those Controversies Defined by the Presence of a
State as a Party
Finally, the word “those” could refer only to those
controversies that are defined by the presence of a state as a
party. Justice Marshall endorsed this reading in his
landmark decision Cohens v. Virginia.57 Marshall stated:
“the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in cases
where a State is a party, refers to those cases in which,
according to the grant of power made in the preceding clause,
jurisdiction might be exercised in consequence of the
character of the party.”58 Other Supreme Court cases have
also embraced this “diversity” reading of the Court’s original
jurisdiction.59 This reading has further been endorsed by
scholars, such as Professor Amar, who refers to this
interpretation of the word “those” as the “diversity”
encompass all the ‘cases’ that Article III defines as arising under federal law.”);
see also STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 25
(2010) (calling Marshall’s holding in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia that the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction “only in those cases where a state is a
party and the case involves another state, a citizen of a different state, or a
foreign state” a “highly dubious interpretation of the Constitution”).
57. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 398 (1821).
58. Id.; see also id. at 393–94 (“When . . . the Constitution declares the
jurisdiction, in cases where a State shall be a party, to be original, . . . the
conclusion seems irresistible, that its framers designed to include in th[is] . . .
class those cases in which jurisdiction is given, because a State is a party . . . .”).
59. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 463–464 (1945)
(“Clause 2 of § 2 of Article III confers on this Court jurisdiction of those cases ‘in
which a State shall be Party.’ But Clause 2 of § 2 merely distributes the
jurisdiction conferred by Clause 1 of § 2.”); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U.S. 313, 321 (1934) (“[W]hile Clause two of § 2 of Article III gives this Court
original jurisdiction in those cases in which ‘a State shall be Party,’ . . . Clause
two merely distributes the jurisdiction conferred by Clause one . . .”); Texas v.
ICC, 258 U.S. 158, 163–65 (1922); California v. S. Pac. Co., 157 U.S. 229, 257–58
(1895) (“The language, ‘in all cases in which a State shall be party,’ means in all
the cases above enumerated in which a state shall be a party . . . . This second
Clause distributes the jurisdiction conferred in the previous one into original and
appellate jurisdiction, but does not profess to confer any. The original jurisdiction
depends solely on the character of the parties, and is confined to the cases in
which are those enumerated parties and those only.”); Louisiana v. Texas, 176
U.S. 1, 15–16 (1900) (same).

208

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

reading.60
Thus, this third “diversity” reading is the dominant
theory of the Supreme Court’s state-party-based original
jurisdiction.61 Many commentators, however, have argued
that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence does not precisely
track Cohens’s diversity interpretation of the Court’s original
jurisdiction. These commentators state that the “diversity”
interpretation means that the Supreme Court’s state-partybased original jurisdiction comprehends the three cases in
which federal jurisdiction exists based on the presence of a
state as a party; namely, “(1) Controversies between two or
more States; . . . (2) between a State and Citizens of another
State; . . . and (3) between a State . . . and foreign States,

60. Amar, supra note 11, at 488–92.
61. Some scholars have argued that Marshall retreated from this view in
Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828), when he noted that
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction would include that admiralty case to
which a state is a party. Id. at 124 (“The decree cannot be sustained as against
the state, because, if the 11th amendment to the Constitution, does not extend to
proceedings in admiralty, it was a case for the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.”). See, e.g., STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 619 n.2
(10th ed. 2013); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1967, 1967 n.427 (calling
the opinion “irredeemably flawed as a matter of law.” “The entire edifice rested
on two propositions, both of which were false. . . . [U]nder art. III, § 2, admiralty
jurisdiction does not fall within the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.”);
Pfander, supra note 56, at 644 (“In his subsequent opinion in Governor of Georgia
v. Madrazo, moreover, Marshall casually rejects the implications of his Cohens
dicta in holding that admiralty claims against the states were proper subjects for
original Supreme Court cognizance . . . . If we take this reading of Madrazo
seriously, it casts doubt on the depth of Marshall’s own commitment to a diverseparty reading of the Original Jurisdiction Clause.”) (footnote omitted). These
scholars are mistaken, however, and the stray line in Madrazo is perfectly
consistent with Cohens. The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction would have
extended to that case, not because it was an admiralty case to which a state was
a party, as the scholars seem to have construed Marshall’s words, but because it
was a case between a state and a foreign citizen, Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 118
(Marshall describing the libellant as “Juan Madrazo, a Spaniard, residing in the
Island of Cuba”), and thus within the state-party-based jurisdiction conferred by
Article III, Section 2, Clause 2’s conferral to the Supreme Court of original
jurisdiction over state-party controversies. See Currie, supra note 8, at 698 n.319
(stating Marshall found that the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over
the case “because it was a suit between a state and a foreign national”).
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Citizens or Subjects.”62 The line of cases asserting the Court’s
original jurisdiction over controversies between the United
States and a state, however, these commentators argue,
insert an additional and extra-textual grant of jurisdiction.
The first Justice Harlan delivered the Court’s defense of
its original jurisdiction over state-United States disputes in
United States v. Texas,63 and this case has been the target of
accusations of inconsistency and illegitimacy. Justice
Frankfurter, for instance, writing in dissent fifty years after
United States v. Texas, stated that “the mere[] literal
language of the Constitution precluded” the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction over controversies between the United
States and a state.64
The Wright & Miller treatise has stated that Cohens’s
“diversity” reading “has been flatly rejected, however, in the
cases that establish original jurisdiction for actions between
a state and the United States.”65 This jurisprudence
“necessarily defeats the argument that it is limited to cases
in which the judicial power is defined by the presence of a
state as a party.”66 The Hart & Wechsler casebook also states
that United States v. Texas “rejected that narrow

62. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (numbering is not in original and has been
added for clarity). See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article
III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1597 n.96 (1990) (“More difficult is the question
whether the jurisdiction extends to cases that are within the judicial power, but
not by virtue of the fact that the state is a party—as might be true of federal
question cases or cases in which the United States is a party. The court declined
jurisdiction in the first situation, see California v. Southern Pacific Co., 157 U.S.
229, 257–62 (1895), but accepted it in the second, see United States v. Texas, 143
U.S. 621 (1892).”).
63. 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892).
64. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 598 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); see CHARLES EVAN HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: ITS FOUNDATION, METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 120 (1928) (calling the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over cases between the United States and
a state “within the spirit of the Constitution although not conferred by its letter”).
65. 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 194 (3d
ed., 2007).
66. Id.
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construction” that the Court’s original jurisdiction extends
only to state-party-based grants of jurisdiction.67 Professor
Amar has similarly argued that
[t]he words of Cohens, along with the textual, structural, and
geographic arguments presented above, suggest that the Court later
erred in upholding its original jurisdiction in a suit between the
United States and a state (United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621
(1892)), and that 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (b)(2) (1982), giving the Court
original jurisdiction in such a suit, is unconstitutional.68

These scholars have not been alone in criticizing United
States v. Texas.69 Indeed, to read Federal Courts casebooks,
hornbooks, and treatises, it has become standard to question
United States v. Texas and assume that it is irreconcilable
with the Court’s original jurisdiction jurisprudence and
clashes with the Constitution itself.70

67. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 257.
68. Amar, supra note 11, at 491 n.217. For another example of a scholar
considering United States v. Texas to be irreconcilable with the Court’s doctrine,
see Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 11 n.45 (1989) (“[D]ifficult to justify
doctrinally is the conclusion in United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892), that
the United States could sue a state within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, in light of the Court’s conclusion elsewhere that the fact that a state is a
party is insufficient, standing alone, to bring the case within the Court’s original
jurisdiction and that only those cases to which the judicial power extends because
of a party-alignment including a state are within the original jurisdiction . . . .”).
69. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 8, at 693 n.290 (“The Court’s later decision to
entertain original jurisdiction in a controversy between the United States and a
state, United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643–45 (1892), is inconsistent with
[Cohens’s] reasoning.”); Currie, supra note 7, at 330 n.46 (arguing that Justice
Harlan in United States v. Texas “ignor[ed] Marshall’s express alternative
holding in Cohens . . . that the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction in cases ‘in
which a State shall be Party’ was limited to those cases in which the only basis
of federal jurisdiction is that a state is a party”); Lee, supra note 9, at 1789–91
(assuming that United States v. Texas was wrongly decided).
70. See, e.g., ROBERT N. CLINTON, ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 1434 (1996) (“[D]id the Court in United States v. Texas get it right?
Consider the statement of the dissenters in that case”); CURRIE, supra note 12, at
323 (“Can Texas and Cohens stand together?”); LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL
COURTS 160 (2d ed. 2003) (“Suits in which the United States is a party are on the
Article III menu, but not because a state is invariably a party. Accordingly, the

2018]

FEDERAL-STATE CONTROVERSIES

211

Many commentators have also criticized Justice
Harlan’s reasoning in United States v. Texas.71 Indeed,
scholars have assumed that Justice Harlan was here
declaring that the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction
over all cases arising under any head of federal jurisdiction,
including federal question, where a state happened to be a
party.72
Thus, most commentators assume that either Cohens’s
“diversity” reading is correct, in which case United States v.
Texas was wrongly decided, or United States v. Texas was
correct and the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over
all federal question cases where a state is a party, in which
case Texas v. ICC was wrongly decided.
But perhaps these cases were all correctly decided,
because the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over
controversies between states, between a state and an out-ofstate-citizen, between a state and a foreign state or its
citizens, and over a fourth category: suits between the United
States and a state.
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over
controversies between a state and the United States because
the constitutional language extending federal jurisdiction
over controversies “to which the United States shall be a
party” is a combination of two jurisdictional grants: over
controversies between the United States and an individual
state, and over controversies between the United States and
other parties.73 This was the meaning the framers expected
Court was forced to carve out an exception to the usual understanding of original
jurisdiction[,] . . . the usual limitation of original jurisdiction to three kinds of
diversity actions notwithstanding.”).
71. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 10, at 103 (“Perhaps the Court placed
greater reliance on a structural analogy than on its strained textual claim.”).
72. See Pfander, supra note 56, at 574.
73. Professor Pfander, while expressly not endorsing this view, does suggest
in a footnote that something like it might offer an alternative basis to justify
United States v. Texas. See Pfander, supra note 56, at 575–76 n.77 (“[S]ubstantial
historical support exists for reading the Court’s original jurisdiction as
encompassing controversies between the United States and a state, even if one
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the language to express, and was the meaning that the
ratifiers understood the language to signify. Thus, under
Cohens’s diversity rationale of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction, controversies between the United States and a
state is one of the enumerated controversies to which a state
is a party.
II. HISTORY OF ARTICLE III
A. Constitutional Convention
The records from the Philadelphia convention suggest
that Article III’s extension of federal jurisdiction to
“controversies to which the United States is a party” was
understood by the framers to be a combination of two
provisions: controversies between the United States and an
individual state or states, and other controversies to which
the United States is a party.
Several early proposals specifically recognized the need
for an arbiter over disputes between one of the United States
and the other states assembled together as the federal
government. Alexander Hamilton’s proposed plan, for

accepts (as I do not) the Court’s assumption that its original jurisdiction focuses
exclusively on party alignments. As originally drafted, the U.S.-party provision
expressly embraced controversies between the United States as a party and one
or more states or citizens. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 342 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) . . . . Although the final language chosen
refers more generally to controversies to which the U.S. shall be a party, the
Convention apparently assumed that disputes between the United States and the
states were encompassed within the clause. See id. at 465 (‘Mr. Madison
considered the claim of the U.S. [to territories involved in disputes with the
states] as in fact favored by the jurisdiction of the Judicial power of the U- S- over
controversies to which they should be parties.’).”); see also Caminker, supra note
10, at 103, 103 n.62 (suggesting that this thesis may be the “best support for the
Court’s holding that United States-against-state suits fall within its original
jurisdiction” and further suggesting that it might be bolstered by the following
citation: “THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (‘Controversies between the nation and its members [meaning states]
or citizens can only be properly referred to the national tribunals. Any other plan
would be contrary to reason, to precedent, and to decorum.’).”).
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instance, would have given the Supreme Court “original
jurisdiction in all cases in which the United States shall be a
party, in all controversies between the United States, and a
particular State.”74 Under Hamilton’s plan, controversies
between a state and the United States over “claim of
territory” were to be subject to a complex special court
reminiscent of that under the Articles of Confederation.75
Similarly, Paterson appended to his New Jersey Plan the
resolution “that provision ought to be made for hearing and
deciding upon all disputes arising between the United States
and an individual State respecting territory.”76
Later in the convention, on August 20, 1787, when the
draft constitution did not yet provide for jurisdiction over any
cases where the United States was a party, Madison and
Pinckney submitted to the Committee of Detail the
resolution that “[t]he Jurisdiction of the supreme Court shall
be extended to all controversies between the U.S. and an
individual State, or the U.S. and the Citizens of an individual
State.”77 Two days later, on August 22, Rutledge reported
that the Committee had considered the proposal and
recommended adding to the federal jurisdiction
controversies “between the United States and an individual
State, or the United States and an individual person.”78
A few days later, on August 27, Rutledge assumed that
74. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 626 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]. It is not clear when
Hamilton composed this plan, nor with whom he shared it. It varies considerably
from the plan he presented to the convention on June 18. Id. at 617–18. Some
have argued that Hamilton composed this later draft sometime near the end of
the convention, 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 253 n.2 (Harold C. Syrett,
ed., 1962), while other have argued it was contemporaneous with his June 18
speech, 3 JOHN C. HAMILTON, LIFE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A HISTORY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 284–302 (1879).
75. FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 74, at 626.
76. Id. at 611 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. 2 THE RECORDS
Farrand ed., 1911) .
78. Id. at 367.
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the Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction over
cases between a state and the United States. The convention
was discussing tenure of federal judges. John Dickinson
moved to amend the draft constitution by adding, after the
words “good behavior,” the words “provided that they may be
removed by the Executive on the application [by] the Senate
and House of Representatives.”79 Rutledge opposed the
amendment, stating, “[i]f the supreme Court is to judge
between the U.S. and particular States, this alone is an
insuperable objection to the motion.”80 In other words,
because the Supreme Court would hear cases between the
United States and an individual state, it was necessary that
the justices be entirely independent of the whims of the
Executive and Legislative branches, lest their votes be
swayed.
Madison and Morris then moved to add to the Judiciary
Article a grant of federal jurisdiction over controversies “to
which the United States shall be a Party,” which was
approved.81 Because Madison had been the one to
recommend extending the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to
“all controversies between the U.S. and an individual state,
or the U.S. and the citizens of an individual state,” it is
reasonable to assume that his proposal to add jurisdiction
over controversies “to which the United States shall be a
party,” was a combination of those two categories. The
convention approved this addition.82
The convention then voted to extend the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction to controversies to which the
United States was a party, in addition to state-party
controversies.83 The convention then immediately changed
its mind, and removed the Court’s original jurisdiction over
79. Id. at 428.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 423, 430.
82. See id. at 424.
83. Id.
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all United-States-party cases.84 Although there is no
recorded debate over this abrupt about-face, it is likely that
the convention recognized that, while it did want the
Supreme Court to have original jurisdiction over cases
between the United States and an individual state, it did not
want it to have original jurisdiction over every controversy
the United States had with any individual person.
Soon thereafter, on August 30, the delegates engaged in
a discussion that shows they assumed that competing claims
between the United States and a state would be litigated
before the Supreme Court.85 While discussing what would
become Article IV, Daniel Carroll of Maryland moved to add
the words “Provided nevertheless that nothing in this
Constitution shall be construed to affect the claim of the U.S.
to vacant lands ceded to them by the Treaty of peace.”86
Carroll stated that he meant this to apply both to lands
claimed by particular states, and those not claimed by any
particular states.87 Madison stated that, while he thought it
best to be silent, he felt that if such a provision were
included, it should also “declare that the claims of particular
States also should not be affected.”88
Carroll withdrew his motion, and moved in its stead:
“Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to alter the
claims of the U.S. or of the individual States to the Western
territory, but all such claims shall be examined into &
decided upon, by the Supreme Court of the U. States.”89
Morris moved that this be changed as follows:

84. Id. It was moved to add: “[b]ut in cases in which the United States shall
be a Party ‘the jurisdiction shall be original or appellate as the Legislature may
direct,’” but this motion was voted down. Id. at 424–25.
85. Id. at 465.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 465–66.
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The Legislature shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the U. States; and nothing in this constitution
contained, shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims either of
the U— S— or of any particular State . . . .90

This was unanimously approved.91
Luther Martin moved to add to this provision lines that
Carroll had included but which Morris had omitted: “[b]ut all
such claims may be examined into & decided upon by the
supreme Court of the U—States.”92 Morris stated that “this
is unnecessary, as all suits to which the U. S— are parties—
are already to be decided by the Supreme Court.”93 Martin
insisted, arguing that “it is proper in order to remove all
doubts on this point.”94 Martin’s amendment was voted
down.95
This exchange reveals two assumptions shared by the
delegates to the Philadelphia convention. First, it shows that
the delegates recognized that there could arise boundary
disputes or competing claims to land between the United
States and a particular state. Second, it shows that the
delegates assumed such claims would be heard by the
Supreme Court in the first instance.
Thus, as the convention proceedings show, the
constitutional language “[c]ontroversies to which the United
States shall be a [p]arty”96 was the combination of two
jurisdictional grants, one over controversies between the
United States and an individual state, and one over
controversies between the United States and other parties.

90. Id. at 466.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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Such a combination was a natural linguistic choice that
privileged brevity without sacrificing precision.
B. Ratification
The ratification debates also reveal that the voters
understood the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to
extend to cases between the United States and a state. The
convention debates contain precious little exposition of
Article III.97 Nevertheless, those authors that do discuss the
provision confirm that the public meaning of the relevant
language was the same as the framers at the Philadelphia
convention expected it to express.
Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 80, discussed the
federal judiciary’s jurisdiction over “controversies to which
the United States shall be a party,” and defined it just as the
framers had in convention: as a combination of controversies
between the United States and a state, and controversies
between the United States and other parties. Hamilton
justified federal jurisdiction over “all those [causes] in which
the United States are a party,” by stating: “Still less need be
said in regard to [this] point. Controversies between the
nation and its members or citizens, can only be properly
referred to the national tribunals.”98 By “members” of the
nation, Hamilton was referring to the states. Similarly,
James Wilson, in a speech to the Pennsylvania ratification
convention on December 7, 1787, while discussing the grant
of federal jurisdiction over “controversies to which the United
States shall be a party,” argued that the federal judiciary
would prevail when states “should be engaged in a

97. See, e.g., Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 600 (1918) (“[I]n the
Convention, so far as the published debates disclose, the [judiciary] provisions . . .
were adopted without debate.”); MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 154 (1913) (“[T]here is surprisingly little on
the subject [of the judiciary] to be found in the records of the convention.”).
98. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey &
James McClellan eds., 2001) (emphasis added).
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controversy with the United States.”99
Even those who had not been at the Philadelphia
convention assumed that the Supreme Court would have
original jurisdiction over controversies between the United
States and a state. The pseudonymous author Aristides
described the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction as
extending to, among other party configurations, “1. Cases
between the United States, and one or more of the individual
states.”100 As Samuel Osgood wrote to Samuel Adams on
January 5, 1788, “[w]here the united States are a Party
against a State the supreme Judicial Court have expressly
original Jurisdiction.”101 Indeed, Osgood continued, if any
state should object to an act of Congress, “the legal Remedy
is to try the Question before the supreme Judicial Court.’102
C. The First Decade
There is ample evidence from the Republic’s first decade
showing the general understanding that Article III granted
the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over cases between
a state and the United States.
The Georgia House of Representatives, for instance, had
occasion, while Chisholm v. Georgia103 was pending in the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, to give its
interpretation of the scope of that jurisdiction. After Georgia
99. See James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, reprinted in 1 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 247 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds.,
2007).
100. Aristides, reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 533 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino
eds., 1984) [hereinafter DHRC].
101. Letter from Samuel Osgood to Samuel Adams (January 5, 1788), reprinted
in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 619
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984). Osgood feared that the
Supreme Court would exercise its equitable powers over such legal suits to
vindicate congressional statutes that violate the Constitution. See id.
102. Id.
103. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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refused to appear before the Supreme Court, the Georgia
House of Representatives passed a resolution, stating that
Article III gave the Supreme Court the power “to hear and
determine” only those “causes commenced by a state as a
plaintiff against a citizen as defendant, or in cases where two
states are parties or between the United States and an
individual state.”104
St. George Tucker similarly interpreted the Court’s
original jurisdiction to extend to state-United States
controversies. As he put it in his Commentaries on
Blackstone, “[a]s here applied [in the Clause granting federal
jurisdiction over ‘controversies to which the United States
shall be a party’], it seems particularly appropriate to such
disputes as might arise between the U. States, and any one
or more states, respecting territorial, or fiscal, matters.”105
Representative Samuel Dana, during the debates over
the 1802 Judiciary Act, gave an extended disquisition,
describing the importance of having a tribunal to decide
controversies that might arise between states or between a
state and the United States:
[T]here were . . . various restrictive provisions in the Constitution,
which appear framed to guard against evils which might be
apprehended from the change of system. Restrictions were imposed
on the powers of Congress, and the respective states. Some of the
restrictions, undoubtedly, were to guard individuals against public
oppression; and some, to guard the particular States against the
Government of the United States, or against each other.
Controversies were known to exist between particular States and
others might be expected to arise, as well as controversies between
a State and the United States. The parties in such controversies
would be powerful, each might put armed forces in motion. When
provision was to be made for questions of this nature, who could
hesitate to acknowledge the importance of establishing an impartial

104. Proceedings of the Georgia House of Representatives, Dec. 14, 1792,
reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 161–62 (Maeva, et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter DHSC].
105. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 420 app. (St. George Tucker ed.,
1803).
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tribunal beyond the immediate control of either party? A tribunal,
the constitution of which might inspire general confidence, and
thereby prevent the recourse to a very different mode of deciding
conflicting pretensions.106

Similarly, Section 13 of the First Judiciary Act defined
the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction:
Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies
of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state
and its citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other
states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not
exclusive jurisdiction.107

According to this Section, the Supreme Court was to
have original jurisdiction over all civil controversies where a
state is a party, except between a state and its own citizens,
thus including United States-state disputes.
Professor Thomas Lee argues that the Judiciary Act’s
explicit exclusion of cases between a state and in-state
citizens from the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction shows
that its drafters may not have considered the Court’s original
jurisdiction to be limited to the “diversity” reading of Article
III.
[W]hy did the First Congress bother to rule out State-versus-statecitizen suits in section 13 of the Judiciary Act? That is, it would have
been superfluous to say ‘except between a state and its citizens’ if
the only possible litigants in State-party cases were those named as
adverse parties to States in the list of ‘Controversies,’ since there is
no mention of ‘Controversies’ between a State and its citizens.108

Lee concludes that, either the Judiciary Act’s drafters
thought that the Court’s original jurisdiction encompassed
any case falling within the federal judicial power to which a
state was a party, or went out of their way to make it clear
106. THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
SEVENTH CONGRESS 929 (Gales & Seaton 1851).
107. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 13, 1 Stat. 80.
108. Lee, supra note 9, at 1787.
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that the Constitution gave the Court original jurisdiction
only in the three state-as-party configurations.109
In fact, Section 13 was just demonstrating a version of
“collapse textualism.” In the Constitution, the state-party
controversies are enumerated: state-state, state-out of state
citizen, and state-foreign state or foreign citizen. StateUnited States disputes are included in the broader category
of all “[c]ontroversies to which the United States shall be a
[p]arty.”110 What is left? Suits between a state and its own
citizens. As this would likely be the bulk of litigation the
state would undertake, this was no small prohibition. But
how to express it? There are two ways. One is to enumerate
each instance, as the Constitution did in this case. But
another way is to consolidate the provisions and point out
what is missing: all controversies where a state is a party,
except between a state and its citizen.
Indeed, the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors
interpreted Section 13 of the First Judiciary Act just this
way, as giving the Supreme Court original jurisdiction “in
controversies of a civil nature, between the United States
and a particular State—and between particular states.”111
As this Section has argued, the Constitution’s grant of
federal jurisdiction over “[c]ontroversies to which the United
States shall be a [p]arty”112 is in fact the combination of a
grant over controversies between a state and the United
States, and a grant over controversies between the United
States and other parties. Moreover, framers, ratifiers, and
individuals all understood this to be the case. This provision
thus presents a case-study of “collapse textualism.”
The Constitution is a terse document. At a little over
four-thousand words, it was meant to be easily read and

109. Id. at 1788.
110. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
111. Miller v. Lynde, 2 Root 444, 446 (Conn. 1796).
112. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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easily understood. To accomplish this feat of brevity, the
Framers worked hard to abbreviate the words whenever they
could. They relied on antecedents and background
assumptions to ensure that the text’s meaning would be
understood. To unwrap these packages of meaning today, it
is necessary to understand background assumptions.
For instance, in the draft constitution reported by the
Committee of Detail on August 6, 1787, the Senate was given
jurisdiction over “all Disputes and Controversies . . . between
two or more States respecting jurisdiction or territory,” while
the judiciary was given jurisdiction over “[c]ontroversies
between States, except those which regard Jurisdiction or
Territory.”113 When these two jurisdictions were consolidated
in the federal judiciary, the drafter did not write out that the
judiciary had jurisdiction over controversies between states,
both those respecting jurisdiction and territory and those not
respecting jurisdiction and territory, even though such
jurisdiction was not an obvious common law court power.
Instead, they abbreviated the two provisions into the words,
“Controversies between two or more States.”
III. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
A. Florida v. Georgia
The Supreme Court first had occasion to consider the
presence of the United States as a party in an original
jurisdiction case in Florida v. Georgia,114 although the Court
would not squarely address whether its original jurisdiction
comprehended a controversy between a state and the United
States for four more decades.
In 1850, Florida filed a bill against Georgia in the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to resolve a boundary

113. 2 Farrand’s Records 129.
114. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478 (1854).
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dispute.115 In 1854, the United States moved to intervene
because it had granted Florida the lands in dispute, lands
that Georgia claimed to have owned all along.116 The United
States argued that it had a responsibility to its grantees to
intervene in the suit.117 Further, as the Attorney General
argued, the United States has “a general interest in the
question of the boundaries of States.”118 The Attorney
General wanted to intervene “not as a technical party, . . .
but free to co-operate with, or to oppose both, or either, and
to bring forth all the points of the case according to his own
judgment.”119
Both Georgia and Florida opposed the motion, arguing
that the addition of the United States as a party would
remove the case from the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction.120
Chief Justice Taney, writing for the majority, found that
the United States could intervene as a non-technical
party.121 He reasoned that, although the case was a boundary
dispute between two states, “there are twenty-nine other
States, who are also interested in the adjustment of this
boundary, whose interests are represented by the United
States. Justice certainly requires that they should be heard
before their rights are concluded by the judgment of the
court.”122 The United States would not be able “to interfere
in the pleading, or evidence, or admissions of the States,” but
would be able to offer its own evidence and arguments.123

115. Florida v. Georgia, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 293 (1850).
116. 58 U.S. at 491.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 482.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 486.
121. Id. at 495.
122. Id. at 494.
123. Id. at 495.
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The case featured two dissenting opinions. Justice Curtis
stated that the Constitution divided that Court’s jurisdiction
into two classes, original and appellate.124 Because all those
cases that were not defined by the presence of a state were
therefore not part of the Court’s original jurisdiction,
controversies to which the United States were a party must
“come under the appellate jurisdiction of this court in this
distribution of jurisdiction by the constitution,” and therefore
were not included in the Court’s original jurisdiction.125
Justice Campbell, in his companion dissent, offered an
historical elaboration on the claim that the presence of the
United States as a party removed the case from the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction:
There were before the federal convention propositions to extend the
judicial powers to questions “which involve the national peace and
harmony;” “to controversies between the United States and an
individual State;” and in the modified form, “to examine into and
decide upon the claims of the United States and an individual State
to territory.” None were incorporated into the constitution, and the
last was peremptorily rejected.126

124. Id. at 504 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (“In distributing this jurisdiction, the
constitution has provided that, in all cases in which a State shall be a party, the
supreme court shall have original jurisdiction. In all other cases before
mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction. One of the other
cases before mentioned, is a controversy to which the United States is a party.”).
125. Id. at 504–05 (“I am not aware that any doubt has ever been entertained
by any one, that controversies to which the United States are a party, come under
the appellate jurisdiction of this court in this distribution of jurisdiction by the
constitution. Such is the clear meaning of the words of the constitution. So it was
construed by the congress, in the judiciary act of 1789, which, by the 11th section,
conferred on the circuit courts jurisdiction of cases in which the United States are
plaintiffs, and so it has been administered to this day.”). Curtis acknowledged
that his reasoning, none of which has been embraced by the Court, would “lead[]
necessarily to the conclusion that the United States cannot be a party to a judicial
controversy with a State in any court.” Id. at 506.
126. Id. at 521. As we have seen in Part II, this is not an accurate portrayal of
the Constitution’s composition.
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B. United States v. Texas
On May 2, 1890, Congress passed a statute directing the
Attorney General to file a bill of equity in the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction to determine whether Greer
County was within the jurisdiction of Texas or was a
territory of the United States.127 The statute stated that it
desired the controversy to be heard in the Court’s original
jurisdiction “in order to provide for a speedy and final judicial
determination of the controversy.”128
The Attorney General accordingly filed a bill of equity in
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to “determin[e] and
settl[e] the true boundary line between the United States
and the State of Texas.”129 Texas demurred to the bill,
arguing, among other things, that the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction did not extend to suits between the
United States and Texas.130
In an opinion written by Justice Harlan, the Court
granted the motion for leave to file the bill of complaint,
deciding that it did have jurisdiction over the case. Justice
Harlan noted that, under the Articles of Confederation, that
congress was given power to decide all disputes or differences
“‘between two or more States, concerning boundary,
jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever.’”131 The First
Judiciary Act, Harlan continued, gave “exclusive
jurisdiction” to the Supreme Court of all controversies to
which a state was a party, save for those between a state and
its own citizens.132 “Why then may not this court take
original cognizance of the present suit involving a question
of boundary between a Territory of the United States and a
127. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, 26 Stat. 81, 92.
128. Id.
129. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 621–22 (1892).
130. Id. at 626–29.
131. Id. at 639 (quoting ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 2).
132. Id. at 643.
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State?”133
Justice Harlan then underwent an analysis of Article III
that has never been accused of being perspicuous.134 It has
generally been assumed that Harlan’s opinion stands for the
proposition that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction
over any case arising under any head of federal jurisdiction,
so long as a state happens to be a party.135 Such an
interpretation of Harlan’s words, this Article maintains, is
mistaken, though hardly inexcusable, given the opinion’s
circuitous and opaque language. Instead, Harlan makes a
sort of a fortiori argument, in which he argues that, if the
Supreme Court was given jurisdiction over boundary
disputes between states, then all the more must that Court
have jurisdiction over a boundary dispute between the
United States and a state.
As Harlan put it, “[t]he important question therefore, is,
whether this court can, under the Constitution, take
cognizance of an original suit brought by the United States
against a State to determine the boundary between one of
the Territories and such State.”136 If the framers gave the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over disputes between
states, then certainly they must have given the Court
jurisdiction over disputes between the United States and a
state. As Harlan put it, “the framers of the Constitution did
provide, by that instrument, for the judicial determination of
all cases in law and equity between two or more States,
including those involving questions of boundary.”137 Harlan
then asked rhetorically, “[d]id they omit to provide for the
judicial determination of controversies arising between the

133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 10, at 103 (“Perhaps the Court placed
greater reliance on a structural analogy than on its strained textual claim.”); Lee,
supra note 9, at 1790 n.106 (calling Harlan’s opinion “hard to decipher”).
135. See, e.g., Pfander, supra note 56.
136. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. at 641.
137. Id. at 642.
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United States and one or more of the States of the Union?”138
Obviously not, is the assumed answer.
Harlan’s next point was based on the intent of the
framers of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The suit between the
United States and Texas, Harlan reasoned, was
unquestionably within Article III’s description of federal
jurisdiction. First, it concerned the interpretation of treaties,
and therefore arose under federal question jurisdiction.139
Second, it was a case in which the United States is a party.140
Thus, the case certainly was one that is comprehended by
Article III jurisdiction. The first Congress, however, gave
exclusive jurisdiction of a controversy between the United
States and a state to the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction. As Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 stated,
“the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party,
except between a state and its citizens; and except also
between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in
which latter case it shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction.”141 This language was still the law in 1892.
Harlan stated that “[s]uch exclusive jurisdiction was given to
this Court because it best comported with the dignity of a
State that a case in which it was a party should be
determined in the highest, rather than in a subordinate,
judicial tribunal of the nation.”142 Again, Harlan resorted to
a fortiori, rhetorical embellishment: “Why then may not this
court take original cognizance of the present suit involving a
question of boundary between a Territory of the United
States and a State?”143
Harlan did not argue that the Constitution’s words
138. Id.
139. Id. at 643.
140. Id.
141. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 80.
142. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. at 643.
143. Id.
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giving the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in those
controversies “in which a state shall be party” referred to all
nine jurisdictional grants from the preceding Clause, as has
often been assumed. Instead, he argued that the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction over state-party controversies
“necessarily refer[red] to all cases mentioned in the
preceding clause in which a State may be made, of right, a
party defendant, or in which a State may, of right, be a party
plaintiff.”144 By those cases “in which a state may be made of
right a party,” thus, Harlan was referring to a subset of
federal jurisdiction. Indeed, the term “of right” suggests that
Harlan was repeating Cohens’s conclusion that the Court’s
original jurisdiction comprehends those cases where
“jurisdiction might be exercised in consequence of the
character of the [state as a] party.”145
In elaborating on his “of right” terminology, Harlan
wrote several sentences that form the basis for the
conclusion by some scholars that Harlan endorsed Supreme
Court original jurisdiction over any federal question case in
which a state happened to be a party:
Besides, unless a State is exempt altogether from suit by the United
States, we do not perceive upon what sound rule of construction
suits brought by the United States in this court—especially if they
be suits the correct decision of which depends upon the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States—are to be
excluded from its original jurisdiction as defined in the
Constitution. That instrument extends the judicial power of the
United States “to all cases,” in law and equity, arising under the
Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, and to
controversies in which the United States shall be a party, and
confers upon this Court original jurisdiction “in all cases . . . in
which a State shall be party,” that is, in all cases mentioned in the
preceding clause in which a State may of right be made a party
defendant, as well as in all cases in which a State may, of right,
institute a suit in a court of the United States. The present case is

144. Id. at 643–44.
145. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 264, 398 (1821).
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of the former class.146

Again, however, this portion of Harlan’s argument is
based not on the presence of a federal question—a point that
only serves to heighten the appropriateness of the suit for a
federal court—but on Harlan’s term “of right.” A suit
between the United States and a state is one of those
disputes “in which a state may of right be made a party
defendant.”
Harlan then reiterated his main point, namely that the
Court’s original jurisdiction over a controversy between a
state and the United States follows a fortiori from the grant
of jurisdiction over disputes between states.
We cannot assume that the framers of the Constitution, while
extending the judicial power of the United States to controversies
between two or more States of the Union, and between a State of
the Union and foreign states, intended to exempt a State altogether
from suit by the General Government. They could not have
overlooked the possibility that controversies, capable of judicial
solution, might arise between the United States and some of the
States, and that the permanence of the Union might be endangered
if to some tribunal was not entrusted the power to determine them
according to the recognized principles of law. And to what tribunal
could a trust so momentous be more appropriately committed than
to that which the people of the United States, in order to form a
more perfect Union, establish justice and insure domestic
tranquility, have constituted with authority to speak for all the
people and all the States, upon questions before it to which the
judicial power of the nation extends? It would be difficult to suggest
any reason why this court should have jurisdiction to determine
questions of boundary between two or more States, but not
jurisdiction of controversies of like character between the United
States and a State.147

Thus Harlan’s main point here and throughout the
opinion is that the jurisdiction is logically and structurally
implicit and necessary, following as a matter of course from
146. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. at 644.
147. Id. at 644–45.
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jurisdiction over disputes between states. The Constitution
must, Harlan argues, have given the Court original
jurisdiction over cases between a state and the United
States. As the Supreme Court stated four decades later,
“[w]hile that jurisdiction is not conferred by the Constitution
in express words, it is inherent in the constitutional plan.”148
Chief Justice Fuller, joined by Justice Lamar, delivered
a terse dissent:
This court has original jurisdiction of two classes of cases only, those
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
those in which a State shall be a party.
The judicial power extends to “controversies between two or more
States;” “between a State and citizens of another State;” and
“between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens
or subjects.” Our original jurisdiction, which depends solely upon
the character of the parties, is confined to the cases enumerated, in
which a State may be a party, and this is not one of them.
The judicial power also extends to controversies to which the
United States shall be a party, but such controversies are not
included in the grant of original jurisdiction. To the controversy
here the United States is a party.
We are of opinion, therefore, that this case is not within the
original jurisdiction of the court.149

Chief Justice Fuller had the opportunity only three years
later to assert his vision of the scope of the Court’s original
jurisdiction, in California v. Southern Pacific Railroad.150
California filed a bill in equity against the Kentucky
corporation Southern Pacific Railroad, arguing that the
state, and not the Railroad, was the owner of the entire San
Francisco Bay, including all submerged lands.151 California
acknowledged that by certain statutes it had purported to
transfer that ownership to the Town of Oakland, and that
Oakland, in turn, had transferred ownership to the Southern
148. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329 (1934).
149. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. at 648–49 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
150. California v. South Pacific R.R., 157 U.S. 229 (1895).
151. Id. at 254.

2018]

FEDERAL-STATE CONTROVERSIES

231

Pacific Railroad.152 California argued, however, that
the state of California was admitted into the Union under an act of
congress approved September 9, 1850, with certain specified boundaries, . . . that the state, upon its admission into the Union, acquired
and continued to retain jurisdiction over the soil of the beds of [the]
bay . . . and absolute title to the same, subject only to the right of
the United States of supervision over the navigable waters of the
bay.153

California argued that the lands were “incapable of
alienation to any person, or of being reduced to private
ownership.” Therefore, California’s bill sought “a decree
adjudging that the state could not make such a grant to the
town.”154
Chief Justice Fuller, writing for the majority, held that
the City of Oakland was a necessary party to the
proceedings; the presence of Oakland as a party, however,
would make the controversy, at least in part, one between a
state and a citizen of that state.155 This, Chief Justice Fuller
concluded, would divest the Court of original jurisdiction:
Under the Constitution the cases in which a State may be a party
are those between two or more States; between a State and citizens
of another State; between a State and foreign States, citizens, or
subjects; and between the United States and a State, as held in
United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621. By the Constitution and
according to the statute this court has exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies of a civil nature where a State is a party, but not of
controversies between a State and its own citizens, and original but
not exclusive jurisdiction of controversies between a State and
citizens of another State or aliens.156

Fuller then recognized that a federal question may be
involved, but that nevertheless the Court’s original

152. Id. at 252–54.
153. Id. at 252.
154. Id. at 254.
155. Id. at 260.
156. Id. at 258.
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jurisdiction did not exist merely because a case comes under
the federal judicial power and a state happens to be a party.
Instead, it must be a case between states, between a state
and an out-of-state citizen, between a state and the United
States, or between a state and a foreign state or citizen.
[W]e are not called on to consider . . . whether any Federal question
is involved, since the original jurisdiction of this court in cases
between a State and citizens of another State rests upon the
character of the parties and not at all upon the nature of the case.
If, by virtue of the subject-matter, a case comes within the judicial
power of the United States, it does not follow that it comes within
the original jurisdiction of this court. That jurisdiction does not
obtain simply because a State is a party. Suits between a State and
its own citizens are not included within it by the Constitution; nor
are controversies between citizens of different States.157

Justice Harlan delivered a lengthy dissent, which
Justice Brewer joined. Tellingly, however, Justice Harlan
never articulated the principle for which later commentators
have cited his United States v. Texas opinion, namely that
the Court has original jurisdiction over any federal question
case where a state happens to be a party. Considering his
Texas opinion had been written only three years before, if
Fuller’s opinion was rejecting his reasoning, it would be
natural to expect Harlan to mention it somewhere in his long
dissent. Instead, Harlan dissented on completely different
grounds. Harlan argued that Oakland should be admitted as
a non-technical party, much as the United States was
allowed to do in Florida v. Georgia.158
It seems to me that according to both the letter and spirit of the
Constitution this court cannot refuse to exercise its original
jurisdiction over a controversy between a State and a citizen of
another State, because a citizen of the plaintiff State has or may
assert some interest in the subject-matter of that controversy; and
that in such a case it is our duty either to permit the latter citizen
to be heard without becoming a party of record if thereby our

157. Id. at 261.
158. Id. at 263–64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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jurisdiction would be defeated, or proceed to a decree between the
original parties to the controversy, leaving unaffected, in law, the
rights of others.159

Thus, Harlan never articulated the position that the
Court had jurisdiction over any case falling within the
judicial power of the United States to which a state happened
to be a party, neither in 1892, nor in 1895.
IV. REBUTTING COUNTERARGUMENTS
Some scholars have argued that in fact it makes sense
for the framers not to have given the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction over controversies between a state and the
United States. Professor Thomas Lee, for instance, has given
three reasons why the framers would not have given the
Court original jurisdiction over cases between the United
States and a state.
First, Lee argues that, while the Supreme Court might
be a neutral forum to adjudicate disputes between states, or
between a state and a citizen of another state, or between a
state and a foreign state or citizen, it would not be a neutral
forum in a dispute between a state and the United States.160
“The crucial aspect of neutrality . . . would be more suspect
from the State’s perspective if the Supreme Court were to
serve as tribunal in a dispute between it and a coordinate
branch of the national government.”161 This objection,
however, would apply, not merely to the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction, but to any case where the United States
was a party in any federal court. Because every federal court
constitutes a portion of one branch of the federal
government, and the Executive, a coordinate branch of the
federal government, would necessarily represent the United
States in the controversy, any federal court would present
159. Id. at 269.
160. Lee, supra note 9, at 1790.
161. Id.
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this neutrality problem in a United-States-party case. This
argument thus seems to prove too much.
Second, Lee argues that the framers did not extend the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to controversies
between the United States and a state because it would not
“have been clear at the time of the founding how the Court
could have enforced a decision adverse to the United States
in a civil suit.”162 Once again, however, this argument seems
prove too much, because any suit involving the United States
in any federal court, whether or not a state is a party, would
present the same problems, especially considering that, even
when the United States is the plaintiff, a private defendant
could present counterclaims.163
Third, Lee suggests that the framers may never have
considered the possibility of suits between a state and the
United States: “As the alternative of state court forum would
be equally unattractive from the United States’ perspective,
it is possible that the Framers did not consider United
States-versus-State controversies amenable to federal or
state judicial solution.” As this Article has already posited,
however, the framers, both within the Philadelphia
convention and during the ratification debates, did consider
the possibility of suits between the United States and a state
and assumed that they would be heard by the Supreme Court
in its original jurisdiction.164
There have been several other attempts to rationalize
the holding of United States v. Texas with the Constitution.
First, the traditional interpretation of the case has been that
it extends the Court’s original jurisdiction to any case within
the federal judicial power to which a state happens to be a

162. Id.
163. See, e.g., The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 161–62 (1868) (holding that,
even where Congress has not waived sovereign immunity, when the United
States initiates a suit, it may consent to the adjudication of a related claim, such
as a tort suit); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 868–69.
164. See supra notes 74–95 and accompanying text.
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party. As discussed above, some commentators have
defended this theory as the “better view.” But this argument
presents its own difficulties. Consider the assortment of
cases over which the Supreme Court would have original
jurisdiction. First, the Court would have jurisdiction to hear
criminal cases. States could prosecute federal officers acting
under federal statutes for violating state criminal law in the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, even if that officer was
a citizen of that state.165 Indeed, considering that every state
criminal prosecution contains “federal ingredients”166 in the
form of constitutionally protected procedural rights, any
state prosecution could be pursued in the Court’s original
jurisdiction under this theory. Moreover, because the wellpleaded complaint rule is statutory and does not apply to the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, any civil case brought
by a state against any party, so long as there is a federal
ingredient in it, would be amenable to the Court’s original
jurisdiction. Any admiralty case or diversity case where a
state was a party could also be brought in the Court’s original
jurisdiction.
Professor Amar, several decades after calling the case
“unconstitutional,” offered an alternative justification for
United States v. Texas. Saying that Texas “muddied the
waters, slightly,” he argued that “[t]he result of this case can
be best reconciled with Marshall’s approach [in Cohens] by
viewing the lawsuit in question as a de facto controversy
between one state (Texas) and its sister states (represented

165. Ever since 1815, Congress has considered state prosecutions of federal
officers acting under color of federal law to be comprehended within the
Constitution’s grant of federal question jurisdiction, Act of Feb. 4, 1815, 3 Stat.
195, 198, and the Supreme Court has upheld this jurisdiction. Tennessee v.
Davis, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 257, 302 (1880).
166. Justice Marshall interpreted the Constitution’s scope of federal question
jurisdiction as follows: “[W]hen a question to which the judicial power of the
Union is extended by the Constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause,
it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause.”
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
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by the federal government itself).”167 Under this rationale,
United States v. Texas actually arises under the grant of
jurisdiction over “[c]ontroversies between two or more
States.”168 This approach finds support in Chief Justice
Taney’s opinion in Florida v. Georgia, in which the Court
allowed the United States to intervene as a non-technical
party in a controversy between two states. Taney
characterized the United States’ interest as representing
that of all other states, arguing that, although it was “a suit
between two States,” there were “twenty-nine other States,
who are also interested in the adjustment of this boundary,
whose interests are represented by the United States.”169
Professor Amar’s rationale, however, also seems to prove
too much. If the United States as a party is a “state” for the
purposes of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction
whenever it represents all (other) states—this presumably
being some subset of the capacities in which the United
States could be a party—then the Supreme Court would have
original jurisdiction in any controversy where the United
States is a party in its all-states-representative capacity,
regardless of who the other party is, whether a citizen, a
foreign state, or any other party.170
167. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 580 n.52
(2006).
168. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
169. Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 494 (1854). For another example
of the Court considering the United States, when a party litigant, as the
representative of the other states, see Chief Justice John Jay explaining why the
Constitution gave federal courts jurisdiction over controversies to which the
United States is a party: “[B]ecause, in cases in which the whole people are
interested, it would not be equal or wise to let one State decide and measure out
the justice due to others.” Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 475 (1793).
170. See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 583 n.3 (1943) (“The
Constitution confers original jurisdiction . . . [over] ‘those in which a State shall
be Party’ . . . . The United States has never been held to be a ‘State’ within this
provision—and it obviously is not . . . .”); United States v. West Virginia, 295 U.S.
463, 470 (1935) (“Our original jurisdiction does not include suits of the United
States against persons or corporations alone . . . .”). As discussed above, there
was a moment when the Philadelphia convention had approved an amendment
to the draft constitution which gave the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over
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In the Third Edition of Hart & Wechsler, the editors
offered a third possible justification for United States v.
Texas. The Casebook suggested that “the jurisdiction
distributed in the second clause [i.e. ‘those in which a State
is party’] extends only to those classes of cases in the first
clause which are described in terms of parties rather than of
subject matter.”171 This explanation too, however, sweeps too
broadly. Included in the class of cases “described in terms of
parties rather than of subject matter” are controversies
between citizens of different states. Neither the Court nor
any commentator, however, has ever thought that its
original jurisdiction would extend to a controversy brought,
for instance, by Michigan and an Illinois citizen against a
Michigan citizen, even though it would constitute a
controversy between citizens of different states, and would
be a controversy to which a state was a party. Thus, this
attempt at justifying United States v. Texas also falls short.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over cases
between the United States and a state can be understood by
recognizing the process by which the Constitution was
composed and the assumptions of those who wrote and read
it. The document uses abbreviation and consolidation to
convey as much information as possible in a small space. The
grant of federal jurisdiction over “all controversies to which
the United States shall be a party” was understood to include
within it a grant of jurisdiction over controversies between a
state and the United States. This implicit independent grant
was then cross-referenced by the next Clause, which gave the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over “those
[controversies] in which a State shall be a Party.” Thus, the

controversies to which the United States shall be a party, but the convention
promptly removed this provision. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
171. PAUL M. BATOR, ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
297 (3d ed. 1988).
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diversity reading of the Supreme Court’s state-party original
jurisdiction, this Article has argued, is correct, United States
v. Texas is correct, and Texas v. ICC is also correct.

